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ABSTRACT
In the era of digital information, intellectual capital becomes more important to firms because the economic environment 
throughout the world continuously focused on the existence of knowledge capital in the firms to ensure firms’ survival. 
However, the existence of firms’ investment in intellectual capital is not clear because it is reported as an expense rather 
than asset. This situation makes the efficiency of intellectual capital investments vague which can jeopardize firms’ 
performance and value. However this weakness could be overcome with a reliable governance in the firms. The objective 
of this study is to investigate the moderating effect of government ownership (a characteristic of corporate governance) 
in the association between the efficiency of intellectual capital and firm performance. Government ownership has always 
been seen by investors as controversial especially when the government seems to always taking advantage of firms’ wealth. 
This study utilised a sample of 1,048 firm-years data from financial statements of firms listed on the main market of Bursa 
Malaysia for years 2012 through 2014. Findings shows a positive association between intellectual capital efficiency 
and firm performance. However the existence of government ownership weakens the association. Findings support the 
grabbing hand theory which argues that government ownership is seen as negative by stakeholders due to only taking 
advantage and not enhancing the existence of intellectual capital in firms. Findings show that investors still need to be 
alert if they want to invest in firms owned by the government in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the findings could also assist the 
government as owners to listed firms to improve their reputation in order to be seen as the entity that would help elevate 
firms’ performance which could eventually assist to heighten the capital market and economy of Malaysia. 
Keywords: Intellectual capital efficiency, government ownership, grabbing hand theory, Malaysia 
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual capital should be an asset to firms but is not 
seen in the financial reports due to it being reported only 
as an expense (Harisson & Sullivan 2000; Roos & Roos 
1997). In the era where economy is based on knowledge 
and digital, intellectual capital information is a critical 
source that should result in value and competitive 
advantage to the firms (Alfraih 2017). This source on 
competitive advantage is expected and should be able to 
give additional value to stakeholders which eventually 
will create wealth to the firms (Bontis, William & Richard 
2000; Chahal & Bakshi 2015; Marr & Schiuma 2001) 
providing benefits to all stakeholders apart from the firms 
themselves (Lentjušenkova & Lapina 2016). Capital 
market participants have also agreed that investments in 
intellectual capital should be able to enhance the level of 
innovation and profitability of firms (Sullivan & Sullivan 
2000). However due to the reporting of the intellectual 
capital being hidden could jeopardize stakeholders ability 
to refer to its information for their better decision making. 
By using a measurement of intellectual capital as if 
being reported as an asset, prior studies provide evidence 
of a positive association between intellectual capital 
information and firm performance (Clarke, Seng & 
Whiting 2011; Kamukama, Ahiauzu & Ntayi 2010, 2011; 
Vishnu & Gupta 2014). However due to investments in 
intellectual capital not reported in a clear manner causing 
lack of information on the efficiency of intellectual 
capital and could jeopardize firms’ value and performance 
(Zavertiaeva 2016). In order to ensure that the intellectual 
capital efficiency can be more highlighted to increase 
firms’ performance, it is expected that the existence of a 
reliable governance is essential (Nkundabanyanga 2016) 
because the management of intellectual capital information 
needs a decision making process involving innovation, 
perception and flexibility on the part of the decision makers 
(Mahfoudh & Ku Nor Izah 2014). 
 One of the characteristics of good governance in 
firms is the existence of a reliable ownership structure 
(SCM 2017). Typical among firms in Asian countries is the 
existence of concentrated ownership structure and many 
being controlled by government ownership (Romlah & 
Zaleha 2016). Prior research found government ownership 
structure had strong influence in the efficiency potential 
for firms’ intellectual capital (Rossi, Citro & Bisogno 
2016; Sullivan 1999) through monitoring and supervision 
of firms’ activities and ensuring firms’ performance 
is continuously flourishing (Feng, Sun & Tong 2004; 
Megginson & Netter 2001; Nazli Anum 2010; Razak, 
Ahmad & Huson 2008). 
 The main objective of a government owned firms’ 
business activities should be to maximize society’s 
94 
wellbeing and contributing towards the country’s economic 
development apart from achieving the required profits (Lau 
& Tong 2008; Megginson & Netter 2001; Nazrul-Hisyam, 
Rubi & Huson 2011; Norman, Mara-Ridhuan & Mohamat-
Sabri 2009; Yaseen, Rashidah & Abdulsamad 2016). 
However there is a negative perception among stakeholders 
towards government owned firms in Malaysia due to the 
serious loss previously occured in several multinational 
government linked companies (GLC) such as the Malaysia 
Airlines System and Proton (Lau & Tong 2008). The 
negative perception arise due to among others, reports that 
highlight how the government is taking advantage of the 
firms’ wealth and many times could not save those firms 
from debt problems in order to compete healthily with 
other firms. Apart from that, the existence of business and 
political networking in Malaysia is seen as jeopardizing 
government owned firms’ performance because most of 
the political figures appointed as board members did not 
have the right experience and expertise to effectively 
monitor firms’ activities (Azmi 2011; Romlah & Zaleha 
2016; Yaseen et al. 2016). This situation indirectly could 
raise difficulties to manage the governance in the firms to 
form, develop, and benefits intellectual capital related to 
firms’ human, structural and relational capital (Mahfoudh 
& Ku-Nor-Izah 2014). 
 Nonetheless, with the development of multiple 
efforts on the part of the government lately to enhance 
the country’s economy especially on the issue of 
intellectual capital, it is interesting to investigate whether 
the stakeholders is still uncomfortable with the existence 
of government ownership in Malaysia with regards to 
the efficiency of intellectual capital. This is especially 
important since the latest corporate governance regulation 
mandate a serious enhancement through the Companies Act 
2016 and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Goverannce 
(MCCG) 2017 as well as the previous 11th Malaysia Plan 
(spanning years 2016 to 2020) portraying continuous effort 
from the government to strengthen the country’s economy 
on the aspect of intellectual capital. For example, MCCG 
2017 requires firms to disclose in detail each management 
remuneration for stakeholders to be able to assess the 
value of firms’ performance (SCM 2017) based on firms’ 
intellectual capital spending (Pulic 2008). Prior to these 
latest regulations but related directly to our study sample 
were the MCCG 2012 and the 10th Malaysia Plan (spanning 
years 2010 to 2015). In the lack of evidence on the 
moderating effect of government ownership, therefore the 
objective of this study is to investigate whether government 
ownership has a role in the association between the 
efficiency of intellectual capital and firm performance. 
 The idea of intellectual capital (IC) efficiency comes 
from Pulic (2004) and further discussed in more detail 
in Pulic (2008). Pulic (2008) argues that in this digital 
era, firm performance should be look upon based on the 
IC of the firm and not simply on the end results, that is, 
the profits alone. As such IC should be the focus to reflect 
potential firm value and firm performance. In addition, 
the measurement of IC should be based on its efficiency 
whereby the efficiency is best measured based on the 
processes in the operations of the firms. The better is the 
IC efficiency, the better should be expected of firm value 
and firm performance by the stakeholders. Furthermore, 
IC efficiency is important towards firm valuation by 
stakeholders because it would also reflect potential for firm 
continuous survival. Poor IC efficiency would therefore 
reflect poor potential for firm survival. 
 This study looks at the issue of intellectual capital and 
government ownership in Malaysia because Malaysia’s 
effort to achieve the category of a developed country in 
year 2020 has only two years to come and yet its GDP 
per capita is still at the low medium level, that is, still far 
from the level of other developed countries (IMF 2017). In 
her effort to achieve a developed nation, Malaysia must 
be serious in managing its intellectual capital because 
economy in the digital era is the digital knowledge 
economy specially comes from the source of intellectual 
capital. At the same time, the controversial trustworthiness 
of government ownership among firms in Malaysia is 
still strongly debated at the world forum due to the 1MDB 
case which started in 2015 and still unresolved until now, 
involving several key figures of the current government 
political party (Farrel, Tan & Geiger 2017). The 1MDB 
company was formed in 2009 by the current Prime Minister 
of Malaysia (BBC 2016).
 This paper proceeds with section two discussing prior 
literature and the development of the study’s hypotheses. 
The third section will explain the methodology utilized in 
this study. Section four will report and discuss the study’s 
findings. Finally section five will provide the conclusion 
of the whole paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL EFFICIENCY AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE
Knowledge-based theory suggest that knowledge is 
the main contributor or the main source towards value 
creation in a firm through the accumulation and usage 
of all knowledge sources within the firm (Amrizah & 
Rashidah 2009; Bontis 1998; Bogner & Bansal 2007; 
Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Spender & Grant 1996; Sydler, 
Heafliger & Pruska 2014; Zhining, Nianxin & Huigang 
2014). Prior studies provide evidence that a firm source of 
knowledge is the largest contributor to the enhancement 
of firm performance (Amrizah & Rashidah 2009; Bogner 
& Bansal 2007; Zhining et al. 2014). 
 It is expected that firms will combine its internal 
and external knowledge and subsequently create new 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal 1990) whereby with 
those knowledge the firm will be able to compete in their 
relevant industries (Bontis 1998; Cohen & Levinthal 1990; 
Spender & Grant 1996; Sydler et al. 2014). As such the 
firm performance is then link to the sources owned by the 
firms (Fu-Chiang, John & Qian 2014). Firms’ intangible 
sources such as the intellectual capital focused on the 
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usage of knowledge in the process of creating firm value 
(Lentjušenkova & Lapina 2016) which should be able 
to solve many problems (Cohen & Levinthal 1990) and 
eventually able to maintain firms’ competitive advantage 
in the long run (Lentjušenkova & Lapina 2016). 
 Many prior studies suggested that there are three main 
components of intellectual capital, that is, human capital, 
structural capital and relational capital which are expected 
to have positive association with firm performance (Cohen 
& Levinthal 1990; Spender & Grant 1996; Sydler et al. 
2014). Human capital refers to the existence of human 
knowledge within the firms which include knowledge 
from the board of directors members, the management 
team as well as all the other employees. A firm is expected 
to obtain benefits from the human capital resources 
through human knowledge and expertise in the day to day 
operating process which eventually will contribute towards 
the success and enhancement of the firm performance. 
Structural capital refers to the existence of intangible 
items such as the computer softwares which comes from 
the existence of tangible assets in the firms. Firms obtain 
benefits from these structural capital resources through 
research and development (R&D) whereby knowledge 
and other structural capital will be used to produce 
new products which eventually will give positive effect 
towards firms’ performance. Relational capital refers to 
the existence of all aspects of firms’ networking with all 
other entities that communicate and work together with 
the firms. Firms can obtain benefits from the source of 
relational capital through joint process, working together 
with others and helping each other to facilitate and speed 
up the day to day operation of the firms which eventually 
will influence firms’ performance. 
 In the current digital era, competition between firms 
is becoming more complex and must be look at from 
the global perspectives. Firms is expected to be more 
pressured and have to be always ready to increase their 
business performance because the performance function 
as the long term measurement for future endeavor to 
continuously survive in the economic market (Kuo-An, 
Yu-Wen, Hao-Chun & Pin-Yu 2013). Prior studies found 
that investments in the intellectual capital allows firms to 
increase their efficiency in the knowledge system as well 
as escalating the firms’ performance (Clarke et al. 2011; 
Kuo-An et al. 2013). Existence of intellectual capital in a 
firm is important because it is considered as a firm source 
for wealth (Kuo-An et al. 2013) which in time can increase 
firms profitability (Sydler et al. 2014).
 Prior studies found positive association between 
intellectual capital information and firm performance 
(Goebel 2015; Kamukama et al. 2011; Ming-Chin, Shu-Ju 
& Yuhchang 2005; Kuo-An et al. 2013; Phusavat, Comepa, 
Stiko-Lutek & Ooi 2011; Nazrul Hisyam et al. 2011; 
Noradiva, Azlina & Parastou 2016). A positive association 
is also found between intellectual capital components 
such as the human capital, structural capital and relational 
capital with firm performance (Andreeva & Garanina 
2016; Clarke et al. 2011; Zhining et al. 2014; Noradiva et 
al. 2016) within the manufacturing industry (Phusavat et 
al. 2011) and the micro financing industry (Kamukama et 
al. 2010). Firms’ intellectual capital information also has 
positive effect towards firm market value and firm financial 
performance, as well as having potential to become an 
indicator towards firm future financial performance (Ming-
Chin et al. 2005). Prior studies also found evidence of a 
positive association between intellectual capital and firm 
performance in the pharmaceutical industry (Vishnu & 
Gupta 2014); for the sample in all industries on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange (Ming-Chin et al. 2005); as well as for the 
sample in all industries on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(Clarke et al. 2011). The association were also positive 
before and after the financial crisis for firms in Taiwan 
(Kuo-An et al. 2013). The findings provide evidence that 
firms which utilized intellectual capital effectively could 
increase firms’ profitability through time (Sydler et al. 
2014). Based on prior studies findings and the knowledge 
based theory, our first hypothesis (H1) is therefore stated 
as follows:
H1: Intellectual capital efficiency is positively associated 
with firm performance.
MODERATING EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
However, since the information on intellectual capital 
investments could not be reported as an asset in the 
statement of financial position, but only exposed as an 
expense in the income statement, could result in a poor 
decision making on the part of the stakeholders to value 
the efficiency of intellectual capital towards performance 
and firm value (Zavertiaeva 2016). Therefore it is suggested 
that firms must have a good and reliable governance to 
assist in ensuring that investments in intellectual capital be 
seen as more efficient by the stakeholders for the purpose 
of decision making regarding firm performance. From the 
aspect of intellectual capital, corporate governance should 
be responsible to form, develop and obtain benefits from 
intellectual capital to make it more efficient (Mahfoudh & 
Ku-Nor-Izah 2014). One element of corporate governance 
that can be linked directly to the efficiency of intellectual 
capital is the ownership structure of the firms because 
ownership that can control firms’ operation can influence 
the stakeholders’ perception regarding the intellectual 
capital. Our study focused on the existence of government 
ownership in firms that is expected can influence the 
relationship between intellectual capital efficiency and firm 
performance. When the government has a stake in firms in 
the form of controlling shareholdings, they will have the 
right to put several influential representatives on the firms’ 
board of directors (Romlah & Zaleha 2016). Members 
on the BOD that represent controlling or government 
shareholdings usually have the power to decide on critical 
decision making of the firms (Masciandaro & Quintyn 
2008). The critical decision making that involves IC 
efficiency would eventually affect firm performance. 
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 In general, there is two opposite views on the influence 
of government ownership that can become a moderator 
in the association between intellectual capital efficiency 
and firm performance. Under the stakeholder theory, there 
is two stakeholder views regarding firms being owned 
or controlled by the government. The first view is the 
helping hand view and the second is the grabbing hand 
view (Masciandaro & Quintyn 2008; Romlah & Zaleha 
2016). If the stakeholder sees government ownership 
in the role of assisting the firm, it is expected that the 
association between intellectual capital efficiency and 
firm performance will be strengthen, supporting the 
helping hand view. On the other hand, if stakeholder sees 
government ownership in the role of taking advantage 
negatively on the firms’ wealth, the association between 
intellectual capital efficiency and firm performance will 
be weaken, supporting the grabbing hand view. 
 There are prior studies that found a positive and 
significant association between government ownership 
and firms’ market performance (Lau & Tong 2008; Nazrul 
Hisyam et al. 2011; Padmanabha 2016), supporting the 
helping hand view. The argument is that government 
intervention can assist in solving firms’ problems earlier 
than usual, such as easier to obtain financial assistance from 
inside and outside of the country, assisting firms to obtain 
large scale government projects and other assistance that 
can push towards enhancing firm performance faster. Prior 
studies also found a positive and significant association 
between government ownership and intellectual capital 
efficiency (Chiung-Ju, Tzu-Tsang & Wen-Cheng 2011; 
Firer & Williams 2005; Foong, Loo & Rajeswary 2009) 
which also support the argument on the helping hand view. 
 Nevertheless prior studies also found evidence that 
support the grabbing hand view. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) found inefficiency in the management of firms 
under the government ownership. One possibility could 
be that firms’ management on behalf of the government 
were represented by individuals not serious in undertaking 
their responsibilities because they do not have the relevant 
experience or expertise to do the job (Romlah & Zaleha 
2016). There is prior studies who also found that firms 
with government ownership showed poorer performance 
compared to other ownership structure (Nazrul Hisyam 
et al. 2011; Sabur, Omar & Wares 2012; Zeitun & Tian 
2007) supporting the grabbing hand view perspective. 
Prior studies that found increase in government ownership 
result in lower firm performance (Mohammad 2013; 
Zeitun & Tian 2007; Romlah & Zaleha 2016) also shows 
possibility of stakeholders not convince on the supporting 
role of government as firms’ owners. The grabbing hand 
view generally suggests that government representatives 
on firms’ board of directors might actually take advantage 
of the firms’ wealth for their own personal benefit and not 
for the goodness of the people in the country (Masciandaro 
& Quintyn 2008). In the case of IC efficiency, it is expected 
that decision making of the representatives with regards 
to IC investments would only benefit certain factions of 
the government leadership and not the whole country. 
Nonetheless Norman et al. (2009) found insignificant 
influence of government ownership towards intellectual 
capital efficiency.
 Prior studies that linked the role of ownership 
structure as a moderating variable in the association 
between intellectual capital and firm performance include 
studies by Kordlouie, Dehkaiani and Ebrahimi (2014) 
and Noradiva et al. (2016) that investigate the role of 
institutional ownership and management ownership 
respectively in the association between intellectual 
capital and firm performance. Kordlouie et al. (2014) 
discussed on findings from prior literature that investigate 
situation among Taiwanese, Greece and Iranian firms. 
They conclude that institutional ownership has a positive 
role in the association between intellectual capital and 
firm performance. Noradiva et al. (2016) investigate on 
the role of management ownership among firms listed 
on the ACE (Access, Certainty, and Efficiency) market, 
previously known as the MESDAQ (Malaysian Exchange 
of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation Market) 
market, in Bursa Malaysia during the years 2009 until 
2012. They found no significant role of management 
ownership in the association between intellectual capital 
and firm performance. Earlier, Norman et al. (2009) 
investigate the role of government ownership, foreign 
ownership and family ownership towards the performance 
of intellectual capital among firms listed on MESDAQ 
market, in Bursa Malaysia. Their sample was firm-years 
data throughout 2005 until 2007. Specifically they found 
insignificant association between government ownership 
and intellectual capital performance. 
 Findings from prior studies suggested that there is 
no one specific view among stakeholders with regards 
to the role of government ownership as a moderating 
variable in the association between intellectual capital 
efficiency and firm performance. If the stakeholders sees 
government ownership in the helping hand perspective, 
they would presume that the government ownership 
will strengthen the association between IC efficiency 
and firm performance. However, if the stakeholders 
sees government ownership in the grabbing hand view 
perspective, they would presume that the government 
ownership would weaken the association between IC 
efficiency and firm performance. As such, based on 
prior literature and the theory, we proposed our second 
hypothesis (H2) without a specific direction as follows:
H2: Government ownership moderates the association 
between intellectual capital efficiency and firm 
performance.
 Furthermore, there is also a gap in the literature with 
regards to findings on the role of government ownership 
in the association between intellectual capital efficiency 
and firm performance. Hence we decided to fill up this 
gap in our current study.
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METHODOLOGY
The sample of our study is originally 1,200 firm-years 
data of financial information throughout 2012 until 2014 
collected from firms listed on the main market of Bursa 
Malaysia in various industries. After excluding firms 
without complete information (14), firms with negative 
equity values (9), firms with negative R&D values 
(11), firms with extreme values (118), the final sample 
is 1,048 firm-years data. Sample data is between years 
2012 until 2014 mainly due to the time period of our 
study. Nevertheless the time period happens to cover the 
existence of the 1MDB company which was formed by 
the Malaysian Prime Minister in 2009 and had created a 
controversial financial issue at the world level until today. 
Sample data in this study include all industries available in 
Bursa Malaysia including Trading & Services; Consumer 
Product; Property/Construction; Industrial Product; IPC; 
Plantation; Finance; Hotel; Technology; and REITs. The 
main objective of our study is to examine the moderating 
role of government ownership in the association between 
intellectual capital efficiency and firm performance. 
As such, based on the main objective of this study, our 
empirical model has independent variable of interest being 
Intellectual Capital Efficiency (ICE), dependent variable 
being firm performance (PERFORM), government ownership 
(GOVOWN) being the moderating variable of interest, and 
we include several relevant control variables. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
EFFICIENCY (ICE)
Due to the absence of a formal standard on the reporting 
of intellectual capital, prior researchers examine on the 
possibility of the existence of intellectual capital efficiency 
through information on the expense accrued by firms for 
the purpose of managing intellectual capital. Roos and 
Roos (1997) defined intellectual capital as a hidden asset 
whereby its information was not reported as an asset in 
the finanacial statement of firms. Several quantitative 
and qualitative methods have also been utilized by prior 
studies to measure intellectual capital (Bontis 1998; 
Brennan & Connell 2000; Sullivan 1999; Sullivan & 
Sullivan 2000). One quantitative method that has been 
established and continuously utilized in prior studies to 
measure the efficiency of intellectual capital is the Value 
Added Intellectual Capital (VAIC) developed by Pulic 
(2004). The VAIC measurement suggested that as the VAIC 
amount increases, the more efficient is the firm in utilizing 
its intellectual capital asset (CIMA 2004). 
 The original formula of VAIC introduced by Pulic 
(2004) was:
 VAIC = HCE + SCE + CEE
 
 Where by HCE refers to Human Capital Efficiency, 
SCE refers to Structural Capital Efficiency, and CEE refers 
to Capital Employed Efficiency. Vishnu and Gupta (2014) 
added another item to the main component of VAIC formula, 
that is, the Relational Capital Efficiency (RCE). RCE is an 
important component of intellectual capital which refers 
to the knowledge that exist in the relationship between 
employees or firms’ management with external parties 
having interests or stakeholding in the firms (Clarke et al. 
2011; Phusavat et al. 2011; Sydler et al. 2014; Zhining et 
al. 2014). RCE is measured using advertising or marketing 
expenses which usually being undertaken to enhance firms’ 
product and brand value (Ming-Chin et al. 2005). This 
expense is chosen as a proxy for relational capital (RC) 
with the assumption that firms bear the cost to develop and 
maintain relationship with external parties relevant and 
related to the wellbeing of the firms (Vishnu & Gupta 2014).
 This study utilized the measurement of the more recent 
VAIC as follows:
 VAIC = HCE + SCE + CEE + RCE
 Based on prior studies, there is two suggestions 
with regards to the measurement of the structural capital 
efficiency (SCE). SCE measurement originally proposed by 
Pulic (2004) was:
 SCE 1 = SC / VA
Where: 
• Structural Capital (SC) = Value Added (VA) minus 
Human Capital (HC). 
• Value Added (VA) = Operating profit + Employee Costs 
+ Depreciation + Amortization.
• Human Capital (HC) = Employee or Staff Costs. 
 SCE 1 measurement has been utilized in many prior 
studies (Clarke et al. 2011; Ming-Chin et al. 2005; 
Noradiva et al. 2016; Pulic 2004). However Ming-Chin et 
al. (2005) believe that the SCE 1 measurement proposed by 
Pulic (2004) was not complete because it does not utilized 
the information on R&D (research and development) 
costs. R&D costs is usually seen as a driver to the firms’ 
advancement in technology and growth (Ming-Chin et 
al. 2005). As such, Vishnu and Gupta (2014) introduced 
a new formula to measure SCE. The structural capital is 
measured based on R&D costs incurred by the firms. SCE 
2 is measured as follows:
 SCE 2 = VA / R&D costs
 This study measure SCE based on both SCE 1 and SCE 
2 but in separate analysis. Therefore this study measure 
the independent variable, Intellectual Capital Efficiency 
(ICE) generally as follows:
 ICE = HCE + SCE + CEE + RCE
Where:
• HCE = VA / HC. Whereby VA = Operating profit + 
employee costs + depreciation + amortization. HC = 
employee costs.
98 
• CEE = VA / CE. Whereby CE = net book value of asset. 
VA is measured as above.
• SCE 1 =  SC / VA. Whereby SC = VA minus HC. VA and 
HC are measured as above.
• SCE 2 = VA / R&D costs. Whereby VA is measured as 
above.
• RCE = VA / RC. Whereby RC = Advertising expense. 
VA is measured as above.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE – FIRM PERFORMANCE (PERFORM)
This study measures firm performance based on the market 
value of the firms commonly utilized in prior studies. 
The first measurement is the market value of equity over 
the book value of equity (MBE) (Kuo-An et al. 2013; 
Ming-Chin et al. 2005; Noradiva et al. 2016). The second 
measurement is Tobin’s Q (TQ) ratio (Goebel 2015; Kuo-
An et al. 2013; Nazrul Hisyam et al. 2011). Therefore 
firm performance (PERFORM) is based on the following 
two measurements: 
1. MBE  = (*market value of share per unit x 
outstanding number of shares) / book value 
of equity
2. TQ  = [(*market value of share per unit x 
outstanding number of shares) + total 
liabilities] / total asset
*Market value of share (i.e. share price) per unit is taken at 
two dates, that is, (1) at the financial year end and (2) at six 
months after the financial year end. This is to ensure that all 
relevant information has been included in the share price 
of the firms when the decision making was made by the 
investors (Abdullah, Abdul-Shukor, Ahmad & Mohamed 
2015). In terms of regulation, Bursa Malaysia requires 
listed firms to submit their annual reports within six months 
after the financial year end (Bursa Malaysia 2017). 
MODERATING VARIABLE – GOVERNMENT 
OWNERSHIP (GOVOWN)
Government is assumed able to make decision for a firm 
if it owns a holding of 20% and above in the firm (Feng et 
al. 2004; Razak et al. 2008; Nazrul Hisyam et al. 2011). 
GOVOWN is measured based on the percentage of ownership 
owns by government institution, government agencies, 
government investment linked companies (GILC) and 
government linked companies (GLC) in the list of among 
top 30 shareholdings in the firm available in the annual 
reports of firms (Gul 1999; Lau & Tong 2008; Norman 
et al. 2009). The list for GLCs is available on the website 
of Khazanah Nasional Berhad, which is the firm that 
act as a branch of the government investment company 
(Lau & Tong 2008; Norman et al. 2009). Apart from the 
shareholdings measurement, a dummy variable is also 
utilized. Based on the the shareholdings percentage, a 
dummy variable is coded as 1 for firms having government 
ownership 20% and above (Feng et al. 2004; Razak et al. 
2008; Nazrul Hisyam et al. 2011) and zero otherwise. The 
20% cut-off shareholdings is under the assumption that the 
government is able to have a controlling shareholdings 
and other shareholdings will more likely become non-
controlling shareholders. 
CONTROL VARIABLES
In order to reduce the effect of other variables that might 
disturb the relationship between variables of interests in 
this study, we include five control variables in our analysis 
as follows:
i. Institutional Ownership (INSTOWN) – Institutional 
investors usually have many resources that can 
easily influence and monitor the action of the firms’ 
management. As such, institutional ownership 
structure need to be control because many prior 
studies found that it can influence firm performance 
(Kordlouie et al. 2014; Romlah & Zaleha 2016). 
Institutional ownership is measured based on the 
percentage of shareholdings held by institutional 
owners as found in the list of top 30 shareholdings 
in firms’ annual reports, whereby the focused taken 
is to be at least individually at 5% shareholdings in 
order to consider as having influenced towards firm 
performance.
ii. Leverage (LEV) – When firms have a high level 
of debt compared to its assets, it is expected that 
firms’ management will tend to focus more on the 
requirements of the debtholders and less on the 
demand of the shareholders (Clarke et al. 2011; Ming-
Chin et al. 2005). Prior studies usually found leverage 
have a negative association with firm performance 
(Clarke et al. 2011; Ming-Chin et al. 2005; Romlah 
& Zaleha 2016). This is because stakeholders will see 
a high leverage to be a reflection of firms being in a 
high risk situation. Leverage (LEV) is measured based 
on total debt over total assets. 
iii. Research and Development (R&D) – Prior studies 
found a positive association between Research and 
Development (R&D) and firm performance (Clarke et 
al. 2011; Ming-Chin et al. 2005). Firms which focused 
on R&D has a tendency to depend more on intellectual 
capital to increase firm performance. Therefore R&D 
expenditures need to be controlled.
iv. Firm Size (SIZE) – Different firm sizes can result in 
different level of intellectual capital efficiencies as 
well as firm performance. Firm size is measured based 
on either firm total sales vis-a-vis revenues (Chiung-
Ju et al. 2011) or total assets (Mahfoudh & Ku Nor 
Izah 2014; Noradiva et al. 2016; Romlah & Zaleha 
2016). It is expected that firm size will have a positive 
association with firm performance (Romlah & Zaleha 
2016).
v. Industry (IND) – Prior studies found intellectual capital 
efficiency is not the same in different industry (Clarke 
et al. 2011; Ming-Chin et al. 2005). In this study, 
industry is control by categorizing firms into industries 
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as listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia which 
include Industrial Products, Trading & Services, 
Consumer Products, Property/Construction, and 
Others (REITs, IPC, Finance, Plantation, Hotels, and 
Technology).
REGRESSION MODEL
Based on the above discussions, therefore the empirical 
model in this study is as follows:
PERFORMit = β0 + β1 ICEit + β2 GOVOWNit + β3
 ICE*GOVOWNit + β4 LEVit + β5 
 R&Dit + β6 SIZEit + β7 INSTOWNit +  
 β8 INDit + εit
Where: 
PERFORM = Firm performance based on MBE or TQ. ICE = 
Intellectual capital efficiency based on HCE + SCE + CEE + 
RCE. GOVOWN = Percentage shareholdings of Government 
ownership. LEV = Leverage based on Total debt over Total 
assets. R&D = R&D costs. SIZE = Firm size based on Total 
sales or Total assets. INSTOWN = Percentage shareholdings 
of Institutional ownership. IND = 1 for each industry, zero 
otherwise (where industry category is based on the Bursa 
Malaysia category). ε = error term for the model. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1 shows that RCE (relational capital) is the main 
contributor to ICE, with mean value 8.086 or 67.24% 
(8.086/12.0256) of the total mean of ICE, when the SCE is 
measured based on Pulic (2004) formula. However, when 
SCE (structural capital) is measured based on Vishnu and 
Gupta (2014) formula, SCE becomes the main contributor 
to ICE, with mean value of 76.03% (36.386/47.852) from 
the total mean of ICE. 
 Mean value for MBE1 (when using share price at 
financial year end) is 1.055, MBE2 (using share price at six 
months after) is 1.093. Mean value for TQ1 (using share 
price at financial year end) is 1.026, TQ2 (using share 
price at six months after) is 1.049. The range for GOVOWN 
(government ownership) falls between 0% and 76.42%. 
The government is assumed able to make decision for 
the companies if they own at least 20% (Feng et al. 2004; 
Razak et al. 2008; Nazrul Hisyam et al. 2011). The range 
for INSTOWN (institutional ownership) falls between 0% 
and 93.31%. The institutions is assumed able to control 
the firms if they own at least 5% in the firms. Mean value 
for LEV is 0.371 showing that about 37.1% of firms assets 
are being funded through loans.
 With regards to normality of data, Table 1 shows that 
the skewness and kurtosis of all variables fall within an 
acceptable range of ±3.00 (Hair et al. 2010). For variables 
having skewness and kurtosis not within the range, it is 
still acceptable because the data size which is large can 
overcome the issue of normality (Pallant 2002). Dummy 
variables of GOVOWN and IND is not reported in Table 1 
because the dummy variables only involve either the value 
of 1 or zero. 
 Table 2 shows the results of correlations among 
variables based on Pearson correlation. Intellectual 
capital efficiency ICE1 (where SCE was based on Pulic 
(2004) measurement) shows a positive and significant 
correlation with all measurements of firm performance 
MBE1, MBE2, TQ1, and TQ2. On the other hand ICE2 (where 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of variables (N = 1,048)
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis
HCE
SCE1
SCE2
CEE
RCE
ICE1
ICE2
MBE1
MBE2
TQ1
TQ2
GOVOWN
R&D
LEV
SIZE
INSTOWN
-3.104
-0.702
-29.939
-0.386
-5.552
-7.408
-38.671
0.105
0.058
0.218
0.160
0.000
4.482
0.003
6.004
0.000
9.243
1.767
100.256
1.094
31.404
41.370
140.326
3.620
3.761
2.677
2.785
76.420
8.743
0.940
10.272
93.310
3.104
0.559
36.386
0.276
8.086
12.026
47.852
1.055
1.093
1.026
1.049
3.709
6.318
0.371
8.412
28.897
2.291
0.327
22.372
0.198
8.640
9.280
27.115
0.766
0.817
0.474
0.506
11.343
0.715
0.197
0.682
24.405
1.250
-0.629
0.752
1.290
1.565
1.313
0.496
1.553
1.545
1.468
1.478
4.175
0.535
0.393
0.242
0.297
1.121
3.588
1.476
2.748
1.425
1.097
1.087
2.104
1.968
2.069
2.022
18.339
0.474
-0.337
0.108
-1.232
Note: HCE = Human capital efficiency. SCE1 = Structural capital efficiency (Pulic, 2004). SCE2 = Structural capital efficiency (Vishnu & Gupta, 2014). CEE = Capital 
employed efficiency. RCE = Relational capital efficiency. ICE1 = Intellectual capital efficiency with SCE1. ICE2 = Intellectual capital efficiency with SCE2. MBE1 = Market 
to Book value of Equity (share price at financial year end). MBE2 = Market to Book value of Equity (share price at 6 months after financial year end). TQ1 = Tobins’Q 
(share price at financial year end). TQ2 = Tobins’Q (share price at 6 months after financial year end). GOVOWN = Percentage of shareholdings by government. R&D = 
Log of R&D expenses. LEV = Total debts over Total assets. SIZE = Log of Sales. INSTOWN = Percentage of shareholdings by Institutions. 
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SCE was based on Vishnu and Gupta (2014) measurement) 
shows a negative correlation with all measurements of 
firm performance MBE1, MBE2, TQ1 and TQ2, but the 
correlations were not significant. 
 With regards to multicollinearity issue, Table 2 shows 
that variables which are highly correlated, at above 0.90 
are variables which are not examined within the same 
model when they are analysed. As such, multicollinearity 
issue has been controlled (Tabachnick & Fidell 2013). 
Furthermore, the VIF and Tolerance of independent 
variables in all multiple regressions (refer to Tables 3 and 
4 specifically) are totally within the acceptable level of 
VIF below 10 and Tolerance above 0.10 (Hair et al. 2010) 
suggesting there is no issue of multicollinearity among 
independent variables. In Table 2, IND1 refers to Trading 
& Services; IND2 refers to Consumer Product; IND3 refers 
to Property/Construction; IND4 refers to Others (IPC, 
Plantation, Finance, Hotel, Technology, REITs); and IND5 
refers to Industrial Product. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS
Table 3 presents findings of multiple regressions where 
the ICE1 (intellectual capital efficiency) measurement is 
based on SCE1 (structural capital efficiency) following 
TABLE 3. Multiple Regression of Moderating Variable Government Ownership – ICE1 (N=1,048)
Variables MBE1 MBE2
Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF
Panel A: 
Intercept 
ICE1
GOVOWN
ICE1*GOVOWN
LEV
R&D
SIZE
INSTOWN
IND1
IND2
IND3
IND4
R2
Adj. R2
F value
p-value
-0.406
0.006**
-0.001
-0.012
0.034
0.446***
-0.190***
0.001
0.240***
0.165**
0.050
0.263***
0.132
0.123
14.357
0.000***
-1.333
2.554
-0.500
-1.403
0.269
7.135
-2.812
1.208
3.663
2.365
0.724
3.567
0.913
0.471
0.496
0.791
0.246
0.232
0.896
0.680
0.751
0.712
0.662
1.096
2.124
2.017
1.264
4.070
4.305
1.116
1.470
1.331
1.405
1.511
-0.282
0.007***
-0.002
-0.013
0.074
0.492***
-0.236***
0.001
0.212***
0.161**
0.089
0.243***
0.122
0.112
13.057
0.000***
-0.863
2.638
-0.636
-1.410
0.544
7.331
-3.267
1.185
3.017
2.150
1.194
3.071
0.913
0.471
0.496
0.791
0.246
0.232
0.896
0.680
0.751
0.712
0.662
1.096
2.124
2.017
1.264
4.070
4.305
1.116
1.470
1.331
1.405
1.511
Variables TQ1 TQ2
Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF
Panel B:
Intercept 
ICE1
GOVOWN
ICE1*GOVOWN
LEV
R&D
SIZE
INSTOWN
IND1
IND2
IND3
IND4
R2
Adj. R2
F value
p-value
0.183
0.003**
-0.001
-0.011*
0.009
0.288***
-0.131***
0.001
0.127***
0.097**
0.007
0.136***
0.125
0.116
13.455
0.000***
0.969
1.992
-0.553
-1.904
0.116
7.411
-3.112
1.388
3.109
2.238
0.152
2.958
0.913
0.471
0.496
0.791
0.246
0.232
0.896
0.680
0.751
0.712
0.662
1.096
2.124
2.017
1.264
4.070
4.305
1.116
1.470
1.331
1.405
1.511
0.259
0.004**
-0.001
-0.010*
0.009
0.315***
-0.157***
0.001
0.107**
0.094**
0.027
0.116**
0.113
0.104
12.051
0.000***
1.274
2.150
-0.715
-1.745
0.107
7.544
-3.483
1.305
2.453
2.016
0.576
2.358
0.913
0.471
0.496
0.791
0.246
0.232
0.896
0.680
0.751
0.712
0.662
1.096
2.124
2.017
1.264
4.070
4.305
1.116
1.470
1.331
1.405
1.511
Significant at < 0.01***, < 0.05**, < 0.10* 
Note: HCE = Human capital efficiency. SCE1 = Structural capital efficiency (Pulic, 2004). SCE2 = Structural capital efficiency (Vishnu & Gupta, 2014). CEE = Capital 
employed efficiency. RCE = Relational capital efficiency. ICE1 = Intellectual capital efficiency with SCE1. ICE2 = Intellectual capital efficiency with SCE2. MBE1 = 
Market to Book value of Equity (share price at financial year end). MBE2 = Market to Book value of Equity (share price at 6 months after financial year end). TQ1 = 
Tobins’Q (share price at financial year end). TQ2 = Tobins’Q (share price at 6 months after financial year end). GOVOWN = Percentage of shareholdings by government. 
R&D = Log of R&D expenses. LEV = Total debts over Total assets. SIZE = Log of Sales. INSTOWN = Percentage of shareholdings by Institutions. IND1 = Trading & 
Services. IND2 = Consumer Products. IND3 = Property/Construction. IND4 = Others.
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the suggestion by Pulic (2004). Table 3 shows that 
ICE1 consistently have a positive and significant 
association at least at 5% level with all PERFORM (firm 
performance) variables, that is, MBE1, MBE2, TQ1, and 
TQ2, fully supporting our first hypothesis, H1. Table 4 
presents findings of multiple regressions where the ICE2 
(intellectual capital efficiency) measurement is based 
on SCE2 (structural capital efficiency) following the 
suggestion by Vishnu and Gupta (2014). Table 4 shows 
that ICE2 also consistently have a positive association 
with all PERFORM (firm performance) variables, that is, 
MBE1, MBE2, TQ1, and TQ2, however not all significant. 
Intellectual capital efficiency ICE2 is only significant at 
10% level with MBE1, β = 0.002. ICE2 is significant at 
5% level with MBE2 at β = 0.002. ICE2 is not significant 
with either TQ1 or TQ2. Table 4 findings therefore partially 
support our H1.
 Nevertheless, we conclude that overall, intellectual 
capital efficiency ICE for our sample data do have a 
consistent positive and significant association with firm 
performance, supporting our H1. Our findings is are 
therefore consistent with prior literature findings on the 
association between intellectual capital information and 
firm performance (Goebel 2015; Kamukama et al. 2011; 
Ming-Chin et al. 2005; Kuo-An et al. 2013; Phusavat et 
al. 2011; Nazrul Hisyam et al. 2011; Noradiva et al. 2016). 
Furthermore our findings suggest that investors consider 
firms’ intellectual capital information in their decision 
making through time since the association is significant 
at financial year end as well as at six months after. 
 With regards to government ownership as the 
moderating variable and to find evidence for H2, which 
is the main objective of our study, Table 3 Panel A shows 
that moderating variable of government ownership 
for ICE1 (ICE1*GOVOWN) has a negative association 
with firm performance, β = -0.012 for MBE1 and β = 
-0.013 for MBE2, but both insignificant. This findings 
do not support H2. However, Table 3 Panel B shows 
that moderating variable of government ownership for 
ICE1 (ICE1*GOVOWN) has a negative association with 
firm performance, β = -0.011 for TQ1 and β = -0.010 for 
TQ2, and both are significant at 10% level. This finding 
therefore do mildly support our H2. 
 Nonetheless, when ICE is measured based on ICE2, 
Table 4 Panel A shows that moderating variable of 
government ownership for ICE2 (ICE2*GOVOWN) has a 
negative association with firm performance, β = -0.006 
for MBE1 and β = -0.006 for MBE2, both significant at 
5% level. This findings support H2. At the same time 
Table 4 Panel B shows that moderating variable of 
government ownership for ICE2 (ICE2*GOVOWN) has a 
negative association with firm performance, β = -0.003 
for TQ1, significant at 5% level, and β = -0.003 for TQ2, 
significant at 10% level. This finding therefore also 
support our H2 since we do not proposed any direction for 
our hypothesis. As such, our findings show tendency that 
investors in Malaysia do perceive government ownership 
to be unhealthy with regards to being the owners of firms 
whereby government existence in firms is seen as taking 
advantage of firms’ situation concerning intellectual 
capital efficiency (ICE). The government is assumed not 
actually assisting to increase ICE but rather weakening the 
association between ICE and firm performance, supporting 
the theory of grabbing hand view rather than the helping 
hand view.
 Our findings on the effect of government ownership 
as the moderating variable in the association between 
IC efficiency and firm performance is consistent with 
findings from prior studies on the issue of the role of 
government ownership in firms (such as studies by Sabur 
et al. 2012; Mohammad 2013; Zeitun & Tian 2007; 
Romlah & Zaleha 2016; Yaseen et al. 2016; Masciandaro 
& Quintyn 2008).Our findings suggest that for the sample 
of our study, investors do not appreciate the existence of 
government representatives in firms, specifically on the 
representatives’ decision making regarding IC investments 
because the decision making was probably not for the 
benefit of the country but more for the benefit of certain 
groups in the government leadership. Nevertheless, in 
this aspect, the Malaysian government has since react 
positively towards the issue of firms’ governance when 
the MCCG 2017 require listed firms to disclose top 
management remuneration to the public which could 
avoid potential misappropriation of firms’ wealth among 
top management or members on the board of directors. 
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this study is to investigate the role 
of government ownership in the association between 
intellectual capital efficiency and firm performance among 
firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. Even though the Malaysian 
government have taken many initiatives at the country 
level to instigate the citizens to take serious action with 
regards to intellectual capital issues, however it seems 
those actions do not really give a positive impression to the 
capital market participants, especially the investors. Based 
on our sample of 1,048 firm-years data of firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia, being the stock exchange of Malaysia, 
we found that the existence of government ownership in 
the listed firms are perceived as a negative situation to the 
investors. Government ownership seems to be perceived by 
the investors to be taking advantage of firms’ intellectual 
capital investments which result in a reduction to firm 
performance. In the absence of government ownership, 
the intellectual capital investments were associated 
positively with firm performance, as expected based on the 
knowledge based view theory. We therefore extend prior 
literature by providing further empirical evidence on the 
moderating role of government ownership in a country 
whereby there is still a controversial issue of investors’ 
trust towards government ownership among listed firms.
 The findings seems to support the argument of 
the grabbing hand theory with regards to the role of 
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TABLE 4. Multiple Regression of Moderating Variable Government Ownership – ICE2 (N=1,048)
Variables MBE1 MBE2
Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF
Panel A:
Intercept 
ICE2
GOVOWN
ICE2*GOVOWN
LEV
R&D
SIZE
INSTOWN
IND1
IND2
IND3
IND4
R2
Adj. R2
F value
p-value
 
-0.401
 0.002*
 0.001
 -0.006**
 0.062
 0.488***
 -0.224***
 0.001
 0.242***
 0.168**
 0.059
 0.274***
 0.132
 0.123
 14.326
 0.000***
-1.320
1.875
0.315
-2.248
0.489
7.349
-3.117
1.114
3.701
2.397
0.856
3.720
0.824
0.373
0.393
0.790
0.217
0.205
0.895
0.678
0.748
0.712
0.663
1.213
2.680
2.547
1.267
4.598
4.887
1.118
1.474
1.337
1.405
1.507
 
-0.269
0.002**
 0.000
-0.006**
 0.105
 0.544***
 -0.281***
 0.001
 0.216***
0.164**
 0.099
 0.253***
 0.121
 0.112
 12.991
 0.000***
-0.825
2.130
0.028
-2.038
0.776
7.634
-3.641
1.100
3.071
2.183
1.338
3.198
0.824
0.373
0.393
0.790
0.217
0.205
0.895
0.678
0.748
0.712
0.663
1.213
2.680
2.547
1.267
4.598
4.887
1.118
1.474
1.337
1.405
1.507
Significant at < 0.01***, < 0.05**, < 0.10*
Variables TQ1 TQ2
Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF Coefficient t-statistic Tolerance VIF
Panel B: 
Intercept 
ICE2
GOVOWN
ICE2*GOVOWN
LEV
R&D
SIZE
INSTOWN
IND1
IND2
IND3
IND4
R2
Adj. R2
F value
p-value
0.193
0.001
 -0.000
 -0.003**
 0.018
 0.304***
 -0.144***
 0.001
 0.127***
 0.098**
 0.011
 0.140***
 0.124
 0.114
 13.296
 0.000***
1.021
1.248
-0.145
-2.057
0.231
7.358
-3.219
1.359
3.119
2.245
0.259
3.051
0.824
0.373
0.393
0.790
0.217
0.205
0.895
0.678
0.748
0.712
0.663
1.213
2.680
2.547
1.267
4.598
4.887
1.118
1.474
1.337
1.405
1.507
0.274
0.001
 -0.001
-0.003*
 0.021
 0.339***
 -0.178***
 0.001
 0.109**
 0.095**
0.032
 0.119**
0.112
0.102
 11.863
 0.000***
1.347
1.624
-0.436
-1.747
0.252
7.638
-3.706
1.275
2.485
2.023
0.699
2.429
0.824
0.373
0.393
0.790
0.217
0.205
0.895
0.678
0.748
0.712
0.663
1.213
2.680
2.547
1.267
4.598
4.887
1.118
1.474
1.337
1.405
1.507
Significant at < 0.01***, < 0.05**, < 0.10* 
Note: HCE = Human capital efficiency. SCE1 = Structural capital efficiency (Pulic, 2004). SCE2 = Structural capital efficiency (Vishnu & Gupta, 2014). CEE = Capital 
employed efficiency. RCE = Relational capital efficiency. ICE1 = Intellectual capital efficiency with SCE1. ICE2 = Intellectual capital efficiency with SCE2. MBE1 = 
Market to Book value of Equity (share price at financial year end). MBE2 = Market to Book value of Equity (share price at 6 months after financial year end). TQ1 = 
Tobins’Q (share price at financial year end). TQ2 = Tobins’Q (share price at 6 months after financial year end). GOVOWN = Percentage of shareholdings by government. 
R&D = Log of R&D expenses. LEV = Total debts over Total assets. SIZE = Log of Sales. INSTOWN = Percentage of shareholdings by Institutions. IND1 = Trading & 
Services. IND2 = Consumer Products. IND3 = Property/Construction. IND4 = Others.
government ownership in firms. The grabbing hand theory 
suggest that the existence of government ownership in 
firms is not really providing assistance to firms but more in 
the role of taking advantage of firms’ wealth for the benefit 
of a few figures within the government. The findings should 
be of concern to the Malaysian government since this 
negative perception is still around within the capital market 
environment notwithstanding of the many efforts from 
the government to implement the rules and regulations 
on intellectual capital situation in Malaysia. This finding 
should also be of concern to the authority relevant to the 
capital market in Malaysia including the Bursa Malaysia 
and especially the Securities Commission of Malaysia 
with regards to the existence of the government ownership 
among listed firms in Malaysia. 
 Notwithstanding the findings, however, we would 
like to caution the generalizability of our findings in that 
it is limited to our sample of study only, which is only for 
the period of three years, 2012 until 2014, and also not 
on the whole population of the listed firms on the stock 
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exchange. In addition we believe future studies could 
investigate in more detail on the role of government 
ownership by examining a specific time frame of the 
investors reaction on the same issue but on specific item 
of intellectual capital investments, for example during 
the purchase of an expensive computer system software 
or during the announcement of a large R&D investments. 
Nevertheless, our findings do need to be alert by certain 
relevant parties such as the Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) in Malaysia with regards to the wellbeing 
of non-controlling shareholders where the government is 
among the controlling shareholders. 
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